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ARBITRARILY SELECTING BLACK 
ARBITRATORS 
Michael Z. Green* 
 
Calls for increased diversity among arbitrators have surged with the 
growth of the employer movement, so-called mandatory arbitration, which 
requires employees to agree to arbitrate employment discrimination matters 
as a condition of employment.  Despite good-faith efforts by neutral service 
providers, civil rights organizations, bar associations, and employer and 
employee groups to identify and address the need for more diverse 
arbitrators in mandatory arbitration, many commentators still lament that 
this diversity problem reflects negatively on access to justice.  With the 
#MeToo movement’s focus in recent years on the lack of a public and 
transparent resolution for sexual harassment matters, as well as rap music 
mogul Jay-Z’s late 2018 effort to identify more black arbitrator candidates 
for his commercial arbitration matter, concerns about the lack of diversity 
among arbitrators have become even more prominent. 
However, the core of the problem remains:  despite efforts to increase 
diversity in arbitrator pools, parties still have discretion to select the 
arbitrator.  Businesses (and even, to some extent, employees) have no 
incentive to select an arbitrator solely because of the arbitrator’s diversity 
profile.  Representatives for businesses and employees want to win.  They 
believe that result is best achieved by selecting arbitrators they know.  Risk 
aversion prevents those representatives from selecting unfamiliar black and 
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other nonwhite, male arbitrators, despite ongoing diversity efforts to 
populate arbitrator pools with more of these individuals. 
This Article explores how this “win first” dynamic hinders attempts to 
address arbitrator diversity and suggests a different approach by neutral 
service providers that mimics the selection of federal judges.  This new 
selection process will involve the creation of a pool of diverse arbitrators 
with outstanding qualifications.  Then, instead of having the parties choose 
the actual arbitrator, a neutral service provider will select the arbitrator 
assigned to the parties in a random manner, similar to how federal courts 
assign judges to cases without party input. 
INTRODUCTION 
“[A]rbitration procedures, and specifically its roster of neutrals[,] . . . 
deprive black litigants like Mr. [Shawn] Carter and his companies of the 
equal protection of the laws, equal access to public accommodations, and 
mislead consumers into believing that they will receive a fair and impartial 
adjudication.”1 
This quote, from a November 2018 filing2 in New York State court by rap 
artist and entertainment mogul Shawn C. Carter, also known as Jay-Z, placed 
a celebrity spotlight on a perennial problem:  the lack of black3 arbitrators.  
With little improvement in arbitrator diversity despite longstanding criticism, 
the topic received a major visibility boost after Jay-Z raised the issue.4  In a 
 
 1. Petitioners’ Memorandum of Law in Support of the Order to Show Cause for a 
Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 2, Carter v. Iconix Brand Grp., Inc., 
No. 655894/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Memorandum]. 
 2. Similar language appears in Jay-Z’s petition to stay arbitration. CPLR § 7503(b) 
Petition to Stay Arbitration at 3, Carter, No. 655894/2018 [hereinafter Petition]. 
 3. The terms “black” and “African American” are used interchangeably herein.  While 
focusing on “black” arbitrators, this Article recognizes that issues of race are not just subject 
to the “black/white binary paradigm” and apply to all people of color. See Juan F. Perea, The 
Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race:  The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 
85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (1997) (defining the “Black/White binary paradigm” “as the 
conception that race in America consists, either exclusively or primarily, of only two 
constituent racial groups, the Black and the White”).  Diversity concerns for dispute resolution 
professionals, including mediators and arbitrators, extend to underrepresented groups based 
on gender, disability, LGBTQ, and people of color status. See Benjamin G. Davis & Deborah 
Masucci, Diversity Committee:  Solving America’s ADR Diversity Issues, JUST RESOLUTIONS 
E-NEWS (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), May 2015 (identifying these “four underrepresented groups” 
as the target population for professional diversity enhancement efforts by the American Bar 
Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution Diversity Committee).  In focusing on the 
example of Jay-Z’s petition, this Article continues to highlight black arbitrator diversity issues 
consistent with my other work regarding racial prejudice in ADR based on being black. See, 
e.g., Michael Z. Green, Reconsidering Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution for Black 
Worker Matters, 70 SMU L. REV. 639, 643–61 (2017) (addressing and framing analytical 
concepts of ADR in the workplace:  negotiating while black, mediating while black, and 
arbitrating while black). 
 4. See Darlene Ricker, Jay-Z’s ADR Problems:  Mogul’s Case Spotlights Lack of Diverse 
Arbitrators, A.B.A. J., May 2019, at 9, 9–10; Jonathan Stempel, Jay-Z Wins Fight for African-
American Arbitrators in Trademark Case, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2019, 5:22 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-people-jayz-lawsuit/jay-z-wins-fight-for-african-
american-arbitrators-in-trademark-case-idUSKCN1PO32T [https://perma.cc/Z2M6-PY9Q]. 
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commercial intellectual property lawsuit between Jay-Z’s Rocawear fashion 
company and Iconix Brand Group, Inc.,5 Jay-Z challenged the defendants’ 
request to resolve the dispute through arbitration pursuant to the procedures 
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).  As the parties struggled to 
agree on a final AAA arbitrator, Jay-Z decided to pose a legal challenge to 
the lack of black arbitrators on the AAA roster.6 
Jay-Z argued that, because he could not identify a single black arbitrator 
among the list of two hundred arbitrators made available to him, he could not 
resolve this dispute fairly in arbitration.7  Before filing, Jay-Z asked AAA to 
provide a list of arbitrators of color.8  According to the court filling, AAA 
responded to Jay-Z’s request by providing him a list of six arbitrators; only 
three were black and, of these, one was a partner at the firm representing his 
opponent.9  When Jay-Z questioned the list, AAA offered a final list of 
twelve arbitrators that included the remaining two black arbitrators and 
informed the parties that if they could not agree on a final arbitrator by a 
certain deadline, AAA would select the arbitrator for their dispute.10 
Jay-Z requested an injunction to stop the arbitration based on potential 
equal protection violations of the New York State Constitution, alleging that 
AAA had engaged in racial discrimination against litigants by failing to 
provide diverse and representative arbitrators.11  Jay-Z filed similar charges 
under New York State’s human rights and civil rights laws and New York 
City’s Human Rights Law.12  The petition argued these laws applied to AAA 
as a place of public accommodation that had failed to provide equal access 
to litigants of color.13  The petition requested ninety days to find suitable 
arbitrators or a permanent stay of the arbitration as against public policy.14  
Jay-Z also alleged that AAA violated the New York deceptive trade practices 
law by advertising on its website that it had a commitment to providing 
arbitrators of diverse backgrounds.15  According to Jay-Z’s petition, this 
advertising “misl[ed] prospective litigants into believing that . . . [AAA’s 
roster contained] a critical mass of diverse arbitrators,” while offering “only 
three African-American arbitrators to preside over his arbitration.”16 
 
 5. See Lauren Berg, Jay-Z Slams Arbitration Group’s Lack of Diversity in IP Row, 
LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2018, 9:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1105807/jay-z-slams-
arbitration-group-s-lack-of-diversity-in-ip-row [https://perma.cc/KGT5-V8GW]. 
 6. See Caroline Simson, Jay-Z Adds Star Power to Diversity Concerns in Arbitration, 
LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2018, 9:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1111523/jay-z-adds-
star-power-to-diversity-concerns-in-arbitration [https://perma.cc/E7CA-LUE8]. 
 7. Petition, supra note 2, at 7. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 7–8. 
 11. Id. at 9 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11). 
 12. Id. at 9–10. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 12. 
 15. Id. at 9–10. 
 16. Id. at 10. 
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A judge initially granted the motion for a temporary restraining order to 
allow Jay-Z to work with AAA on the diversity issue.17  After the court order, 
AAA:  (1) listed “eighteen individuals on . . . AAA’s national Large 
Complex Case Roster [who] have self-identified as African-American”; (2) 
expressed “a willingness” to pursue other means of improving diverse 
representation in the arbitrator selection process, including the use of a three-
arbitrator panel; (3) agreed to work with Jay-Z to improve the slate of diverse 
arbitrators on that panel by considering candidates proposed by Jay-Z; and 
(4) developed other means to improve the diversity of the panel.18  AAA also 
provided a comprehensive profile of information (including a list of all of its 
arbitrators who had self-identified by race), demonstrating AAA’s efforts to 
diversify not only the panel in question in the Jay-Z matter but all panels and 
disputes for which AAA provides arbitrators.19  After reviewing the 
additional information, Jay-Z agreed with AAA about its commitment to 
diversify its roster and withdrew his request to halt the arbitration.20  
Eventually, the parties settled the entire lawsuit.21 
Jay-Z’s attempt to highlight arbitrator diversity was particularly exciting 
because it allowed everyday individuals without the financial resources to 
raise such a profound legal argument to have their day in court—and in the 
court of public opinion.  Arguably, a lack of arbitrator diversity poses the 
greatest concern when individual minority participants, such as employees, 
face well-heeled and powerful corporate opponents, such as employers.22  
 
 17. See Eriq Gardner, Jay-Z Wins Bid to Halt Arbitration for Racial Bias, HOLLYWOOD 
REP. (Nov. 28, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/jay-z-wins-bid-
halt-arbitration-racial-bias-1164590 [https://perma.cc/L8GW-TZX2]. 
 18. See Letter to Justice Ostrager Withdrawing Motion Sequence 001, Thus Lifting the 
Stay of Arbitration & Requesting a Status Conference in Ninety (90) Days at 3, Carter v. 
Iconix Brand Grp., Inc., No. 655894/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2018) (alteration in original). 
 19. See Rekha Rangachari, Can’t Knock the Hustle . . . [To Broaden Diversity in 
Arbitration], KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2019), http://arbitrationblog. 
kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/15/cant-knock-the-hustle-to-broaden-diversity-in-arbitration/ 
[https://perma.cc/X37Q-LQP9] (describing in detail AAA’s responses to Jay-Z’s lawsuit, with 
links to AAA’s court filings).  In the interest of full disclosure, the list includes this Article’s 
author, as I am a member of the AAA labor panel. See Exhibit 3, Carter, No. 655894/2018.  
Given that this was a business dispute involving intellectual property, I doubt that I would 
have been selected or would have agreed to serve as the arbitrator in the Jay-Z dispute, but 
this broad request from Jay-Z asking for “all arbitrators in the AAA National Roster” 
demonstrated that he was looking beyond just his own dispute to determine the AAA’s 
commitment to diversifying its arbitral ranks as a whole. Exhibit 3, supra, at 3. 
 20. See Judge Halts Arbitration in Jay-Z Suit Because of Racial Bias, FORBES (Nov. 29, 
2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2018/11/29/jay-z-
successfully-halts-arbitration-due-to-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/WU9Z-UZYR]; see also 
Emma Cueto, Jay-Z Claims Movement in Arbitrator Diversity Request, LAW360 (Dec. 10, 
2018, 7:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1109815 [https://perma.cc/SN5C-KEH2]. 
 21. See Kori Hale, Jay-Z’s Roc Nation Gets Iconix Lawsuit Dismissed for $15 Million, 
FORBES (Nov. 24, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/korihale/2019/11/24/jay-zs-
roc-nation-gets-iconix-lawsuit-dismissed-for-15m [https://perma.cc/6KPX-NJNA]. 
 22. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Lost Promise of Arbitration, 70 SMU L. REV. 849, 885 
(2017).  Twenty years ago, this Article’s author joined with others to raise awareness about 
the lack of arbitrator diversity in situations where diverse claimants were asserting 
employment discrimination. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer 
Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 
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For arbitration to be considered a successful form of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) in the future workplace, it must shift away from using 
power imbalances (present in both individual forced or mandatory arbitration 
and class arbitration waivers)23 and instead consistently use diverse 
arbitrators to remove concerns about fairness and transparency.24  Fair 
employment arbitration processes need a critical mass of diverse arbitrators 
who more precisely reflect the makeup of the powerless parties attempting to 
resolve their disputes with large businesses.  However, the key challenge 
presented in pursuing more diversity is recognizing that the parties, 
especially businesses, choose the arbitrators and must agree to select diverse 
arbitrators. 
Unlike general concerns about improving workplace interactions by 
promoting diversity, parties select arbitrators with the goal of prevailing in 
the dispute at issue.  For many participants, arbitration represents a fair 
process with hopefully less costs and a shorter time for resolution when 
compared to the courts.  However, the arbitrator must decide who wins and 
who loses the dispute.  If parties (especially businesses) have their advocates 
push for a specific arbitrator as a means to promote diversity, then those 
parties and their advocates will face backlash from corporate investors and 
higher-level executives for financial and reputational losses incurred if the 
arbitrator rules against them.  This concern suggests that the only resolution 
to the arbitrator diversity problem is to select arbitrators randomly from a 
pool that includes a critical mass of diverse arbitrators.  The thesis offered 
here to address arbitrator diversity would require all key stakeholders to agree 
to a neutral service provider choosing the arbitrator on a random basis after 
factoring in diversity.  Parties would not pick the assigned arbitrator. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the significance of 
continuing efforts aimed at achieving diversity in the arbitral ranks and how 
that diversity has become imperative for disputes where employers insist that 
employees arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims.25  Part II 
 
399, 441–42, 441 n.153 (2000) (criticizing the lack of arbitrators of color and citing various 
sources raising concerns about arbitrator diversity).  Even at that time, others were already 
criticizing the lack of arbitrator diversity in addressing statutory employment discrimination 
claims. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:  Rights “Waived” and 
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 407–08 (1996) (criticizing the 
diversity of arbitrators). 
 23. See infra Part I.A. 
 24. See Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration:  Due Process and Other Constitutional 
Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 860 (2011) (discussing the need for diversity in arbitrator 
pools as “especially important when corporations and other businesses force their consumers 
and employees to accept adhesion arbitration agreements, which raises serious questions about 
the voluntariness of the weaker party’s acceptance of the negative implications from non-
diverse pools of arbitrators who might be biased against them”). 
 25. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits 
workplace discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other protected class characteristics. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).  Title VII, as amended, creates major incentives for 
competent attorneys to help employees bring private lawsuits as part of the enforcement 
regime. See David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 990, 1022–23 
(2017).  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal agency 
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identifies some of the missteps that occur when constitutents seek to increase 
diversity in arbitrator pools without addressing or removing the risk and bias 
limitations posed by parties ultimately having the power to make the final 
selection of the arbitrator.  Part II also offers a hypothetical that involves a 
fictional arbitrator selection process to help illustrate the risk aversion and 
implicit bias dynamics that can arise, especially depending on the experience 
of the parties or their representatives.  Part III proposes a new model for 
arbitrator selection that emphasizes the importance of having a neutral 
service provider, rather than the parties, select the arbitrator.  Part III also 
argues that all the key constituents should agree to such a process, modeled 
after federal court judicial selection, as a way to provide a measurable 
improvement to the arbitrator diversity problem in workplace disputes.  This 
Article concludes that any concerns regarding racial bias and access to justice 
stemming from the dearth of black arbitrators can be overcome by letting 
service providers mimic major digital platforms26 to match a critical mass of 
diverse arbitrators with parties seeking to resolve workplace discrimination 
disputes. 
I.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARBITRATOR DIVERSITY IN EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 
A.  Employment Discrimination Arbitration:  A Forced and Unfair Forum? 
Through forced or mandatory arbitration clauses in standard form 
contracts, employers frustrate employees’ access to the courts by requiring 
employees to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims as a 
condition of employment.27  One of the biggest opportunities and challenges 
when thinking about arbitrator diversity is its impact on the so-called 
mandatory arbitration required by powerful businesses, which has the 
potential to limit recovery, process, and transparency for the powerless in our 
society—those who Jean Sternlight has called the “little guys.”28  When the 
U.S. Supreme Court first endorsed this use of arbitration to resolve statutory 
employment discrimination claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
 
charged with enforcement of Title VII. See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/ 
R7DX-239K] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Noll, supra, at 1014–15 (describing EEOC 
enforcement authority). 
 26. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 185 
(2017) (discussing “labor-matching [platform] sites like Mechanical Turk and TaskRabbit and 
transportation-matching [platform] sites like Uber and Lyft”). 
 27. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in 
Employment Law:  Where To, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 156–57, 156 n.7 
(2019) (explaining “mandatory arbitration”). 
 28. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996) (criticizing mandatory 
arbitration as a matter of statutory interpretation and as an undesirable public policy that 
allows big corporate interests to harm the interests of the “little guys,” including employees, 
consumers, and franchisees). 
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Corp.29 and initiated the barrage of employer-required arbitration that has 
taken over the employment dispute resolution process, arbitration was 
considered just another forum.30  Recent studies suggest that employer-
required agreements to arbitrate have led to a situation where this mandatory 
form of arbitration is outdistancing the court system as the most used process 
to adjudicate worker disputes.31  A 2017 empirical study found that 56.2 
percent of nonunion private sector employees (approximately 60.1 million 
people) are now covered by employer-required arbitration agreements.32  In 
a recent publication comprehensively analyzing that same study, Alex Colvin 
concluded that “[i]t is the employers with the lowest paid workforces that are 
most likely to impose mandatory arbitration on their employees.”33  As a 
result, the overall fairness of the arbitral forum for low-paid workers registers 
as a key concern in 2020. 
Critics also assert that mandatory arbitration relegates employee claims to 
a private forum where the decision maker is unlikely to look like the 
employees and may not appreciate all the unique dynamics of the 
environment that led them to file their discrimination claims.34  Employees 
who seek justice in light of an employer’s racial or other discriminatory 
practices will soon discover the likelihod that the arbitrator, who will decide 
the matter, will be old, white, and male, which adds further concerns about 
the fairness of mandatory arbitration.35  The reality is that the arbitrators 
selected for these cases may tend to look more like the managers or 
supervisors that the claimants have accused of statutory employment 
discrimination.36  Jean Sternlight has asserted that, as the entity with the 
 
 29. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 30. Id. at 26, 31 (“In these cases we recognized that ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to 
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))). 
 31. Alexander J. S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 3, 24 (2019). 
 32. Id. at 10; see also Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 679, 689 (2018). 
 33. See Colvin, supra note 31, at 16.  Unfortunately, improving arbitrator diversity alone 
will not address the overall comprehensive concerns of low-wage workers subjected to 
mandatory arbitration. See Green, supra note 3, at 671–74 (suggesting that mandatory 
arbitration would work better for black workers at all levels if:  (1) the roster of neutrals were 
diverse; (2) unions represented the interests of the workers; (3) employees were provided with 
legal counsel when the union could not pursue the matter to arbitration; and (4) employees 
were always allowed to pursue the matter in court rather than in arbitration when important 
court precedent needed to be set). 
 34. See Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting a Dead Horse—Arbitrator Certification as a 
Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 483, 494 (1999) (describing how “the 
true beneficiaries of the arbitration process, the employees, may begin to question whether a 
system dominated by white male arbitrators is fair”). 
 35. See Victoria Pynchon, Diversity Is Not a Toxic Topic, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST 
LITIG., Apr. 2012, at 83, 86–87 (discussing that many ADR users and executives say the 
market wants an old, white male and probably a retired judge). 
 36. Terry O’Neill, Success for #MeToo Means Reopening Courthouse Doors, LAW360 
(Feb. 20, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1011972/success-for-metoo-
means-reopening-courthouse-doors [https://perma.cc/ZL3S-W5Q7] (noting that JAMS 
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bargaining power insists on privatizing the dispute, the law aimed at 
protecting individual employees subjected to this arbitral regime fails to 
evolve.37 
Mandatory arbitration also poses concerns about access to justice, as the 
most vulnerable individuals in the workplace cannot pursue their statutory 
employment discrimination claims in court and may be deterred from 
obtaining access to workplace justice by the enforcement of both employer-
required arbitration and employer bans on class arbitration.38  With the deck 
stacked against employees in so many ways, especially those who want to 
join their legal interests in a class action, influential corporate entities—the 
parties being regulated by the law (including employers)—can use their 
tremendous bargaining power to make individual employees adhere to what 
some commentators refer to as a flawed system of arbitration.39 
 
reported that only 22 percent of its panelists were female and only 9 percent were people of 
color). 
 37. Sternlight, supra note 27, at 157; see also Estlund, supra note 32, at 679 (referring to 
how mandatory arbitration “threatens to stunt both the development of the law and public 
knowledge of how the law is interpreted and applied in important arenas of public policy”); J. 
Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 
3056 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s enforcement of arbitration agreements has 
started to “impede public awareness of the substantive law, inasmuch as private proceedings 
frustrate the public’s ability to understand the state of the law, how particular laws are 
interpreted, and how claims are pursued”). 
 38. See The Facts on Forced Arbitration:  How Forced Arbitration Harms America’s 
Workers, EMP. RTS. ADVOC. INST. FOR L. & POL’Y 1, http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/Inst_ForcedArb_FactSheet_LittleGuy_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3MWZ-GN96] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Ellen E. Deason et al., ADR and Access 
to Justice:  Current Perspectives, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303, 322–23 (2018) 
(providing my comments and a related discussion of how employees bringing claims based 
on race can face access to justice concerns when arbitration is required, given that the typical 
arbitrator is an older white male); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami:  AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 710–11 (2012) (discussing how 
courts have endorsed mandatory arbitration and refused to allow class arbitration, preventing 
individual claims from going forward as a whole); Nancy A. Welsh, Do You Believe in 
Magic?:  Self-Determination and Procedural Justice Meet Inequality in Court-Connected 
Mediation, 70 SMU L. REV. 721, 733–36 (2017) (laying out the components of procedural 
justice that lead people to “perceive a process as fair or just”).  But see Andrea Cann 
Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation:  Data from Four Providers, 107 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 9 (2019) (finding that “arbitration has the capacity to facilitate access to justice”  
because “[c]ases move quickly through the system, and corporations pick up most of the tab”); 
Cole, supra note 22, at 866 (suggesting that “the arbitral process provides the kind of access 
to justice, together with a fair process, that might well serve both minority disputants and one-
shot players alike”); Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?:  The Case Against 
the Fairness Arbitration Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 277–78 (2008) (asserting 
that “arbitration has in important respects improved access to justice for the average 
individual” because it has “lowered the cost of dispute resolution, it has delivered superior, or 
at least comparable, outcomes for individuals, and it has done so at a far faster pace than our 
sluggish system of civil litigation”). 
 39. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking 
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/ 
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https:// 
perma.cc/2UX3-AMZL] (describing a study of several cases showing that once parties were 
blocked from going to court as a class, “most people dropped their claims entirely” and 
discussing quotes from Judge Berle Schiller describing how employees have no bargaining 
2020] ARBITRARILY SELECTING BLACK ARBITRATORS 2263 
Further, when important issues of law are resolved in private arbitration, 
which does not require a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing, the root 
causes of these issues may still persist.40  This can prevent similarly situated 
employees from uncovering broad discriminatory practices.41  As a result, 
employers may be able to privatize the public system of justice provided by 
an employment discrimination statute for their own personal benefits.42  An 
employer can then use the pressure for repeat business within this private 
arbitration scheme to select known arbitrators who they hope to induce to 
rule in their favor.43  As a result, calls for increased diversity in the arbitral 
ranks have a unique importance to black and other vulnerable employees 
seeking vindication in arbitration for a workplace discrimination claim. 
B.  Arbitrator Diversity Should Match Employee Claimant Diversity 
AAA Chair of the Council James Jenkins reflected on the need for future 
efforts to pursue arbitrator diversity in employment discrimination disputes, 
opining that, “[w]ith more parties choosing to resolve their disputes through 
arbitration and mediation, ADR service providers need to ensure that such 
parties are given the option to select from panels of arbitrators and mediators 
who they believe come from backgrounds and experiences similar to their 
 
power and must face “a distasteful dilemma” of being forced to either “give up certain rights 
[via arbitration] or give up the job”). 
 40. See Sternlight, supra note 27, at 181, 188–92, 202–04 (describing concerns about the 
lack of public access to precedential arbitration decisions; the limits on arbitrators that make 
them unlikely to issue progressive decisions that advance the law; and companies’ use of 
private arbitration as a tool to hide predatory managers’ misdeeds and silence victimized 
employees by suppressing public knowledge about the existence of discriminatory actions); 
see also Richard Delgado, The Unbearable Lightness of Alternative Dispute Resolution:  
Critical Thoughts on Fairness and Formality, 70 SMU L. REV. 611, 630–33 (2017) (arguing 
that corporations tend to act in their own best interests by maximizing profits and that 
expecting a company to behave better in arbitration regarding wrongdoing committed against 
a weaker party is a “fruitless enterprise” because corporations are only willing to pursue 
systemic changes when their public images are harmed); Imre S. Szalai, A New Legal 
Framework for Employee and Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 653, 655 (2018) (noting that private arbitration can conceal corporate wrongdoing and 
harm vulnerable employees). 
 41. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 39 (discussing then EEOC Chair Jenny 
Yang’s comments, which noted that resolution of statutory employment discrimination claims 
in arbitration “keeps any discussion of discriminatory practices hidden from other workers 
‘who might be experiencing the same thing,’” while also reviewing how major court cases 
brought by black employees against Nike in 2003 and Walgreens in 2005 led to key changes 
in those companies’ policies). 
 42. See Glover, supra note 37, at 3075–78 (asserting concerns about using arbitration as 
a mechanism to contract around or “negate substantive law”). 
 43. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of 
the Justice System,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/ 
business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html 
[https://perma.cc/5FXS-9DFQ] (describing several cases in which employees proceeded to 
arbitration after being denied the chance to bring their claims in court, noting concerns about 
arbitrators with repeat business handling cases involving the same employer after they had 
returned favorable rulings for that employer in the past, and mentioning an arbitrator who 
ruled against an employer in an age discrimination suit and was never used again). 
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own.”44  AAA, JAMS,45 and other neutral service provider groups like them 
have the competing objectives of selecting arbitrators on a fair basis and also 
“satisfy[ing] the parties.”46  Providing a diverse pool is not just a nice goal; 
the arbitration system is intended to provide a fair forum for black workers 
to vindicate racial discrimination claims pursuant to a statutory scheme.47  
Failing to diversify the pool of arbitrators sends a “detrimental and hostile” 
message to all black workers that based on history the process “is comparable 
to what all-white juries have done.”48  Ultimately, if arbitration serves to 
replicate the legal system by becoming a substitute for the judicial forum (as 
it has developed under mandatory arbitration), then there must be a slate of 
arbitrators available who “reflect diverse life experiences which include 
exposure to the problems posed by the cases, particularly those involving 
discrimination.”49 
1.  Service Provider Efforts to Improve the Lack of Arbitrator Diversity 
Increasing calls for arbitrator diversity in light of Jay-Z’s lawsuit were not 
lost on the three key neutral service providers handling employment 
discrimination disputes in the United States:  AAA, JAMS, and the 
International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR).50  AAA 
and JAMS are the largest dispute resolution service providers in the 
 
 44. See James Jenkins, Arbitrators and Mediators Should Reflect Society’s Diversity, 
LAW360 (Jan. 16, 2019, 10:51 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1115452/arbitrators-
and-mediators-should-reflect-society-s-diversity [https://perma.cc/C8LM-U7TW].  Others 
have also focused on the failure of arbitrator diversity to harmonize with the diversity of the 
participants. See, e.g., Sasha A. Carbone & Jeffrey T. Zaino, Increasing Diversity Among 
Arbitrators:  A Guideline to What the New Arbitrator Should Be Doing to Achieve This Goal, 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Jan. 2012, at 33, 33–34 (quoting the criticism of Gwynne Wilcox, who 
stated that “[t]he majority of arbitrators do not reflect the workers who appear before them 
and cannot identify with their realities as workers”); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Impact of 
the Growth and Use of ADR Processes on Minority Communities, Individual Rights, and 
Neutrals, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 801 (2011) (“The lack of diversity in the pool of potential 
neutrals raises suspicion among minorities who must use the ADR process to resolve their 
dispute.”). 
 45. JAMS is a private dispute resolution group; previously, the acronym stood for Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. but, at present, the organization uses only the 
abbreviated title. The JAMS Name, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/ 
[https://perma.cc/GM9V-TTQJ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 46. William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?:  The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern 
Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 656 (2006). 
 47. Pittman, supra note 24, at 864–65, 868, 876–77 (discussing unconscious racial bias 
exhibited by nondiverse arbitrators and the requirement that arbitration be a neutral forum for 
an employee to pursue the same substantive rights and theories of statutory liability as is 
provided by the courts). 
 48. Green, supra note 3, at 661 (quoting Gould, supra note 46, at 658). 
 49. Gould, supra note 46, at 688. 
 50. See Paige Smith, Lack of Arbitrator Diversity Is an Issue of Supply and Demand, 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 15, 2019, 6:04 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/lack-of-arbitrator-diversity-is-an-issue-of-supply-and-demand [https://perma.cc/ 
P9VF-6QBM] (referring to “three primary arbitral entities that resolve employment 
disputes”). 
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country.51  Representatives from AAA, JAMS, and CPR responded to 
questions about diversity within a week of Jay-Z withdrawing his petition; 
all reported that they had been engaged in efforts to improve diversity among 
their panelists “for years” before the Jay-Z matter.52 
For example, AAA highlighted its Higginbotham Fellows Program, started 
in 2009, which provides mentoring and training to diverse dispute resolution 
professionals, as well as its separate efforts to include diverse speakers in its 
programs and to build partnerships with national and minority bar 
associations to find diverse arbitrators.53  JAMS emphasized that it provides 
a sample diversity and inclusion arbitration clause that parties may 
incorporate, which states that, “wherever practicable,” the parties will 
appoint diverse arbitrators.54  CPR noted that it created a diversity task force 
in 2006 and that it includes a “diversity statement” when providing a panel 
of arbitrators for consideration that asks the parties to select more diverse 
individual panelists.55 
Additional information supports the diversity efforts of these three 
providers.  JAMS recently hired its first diversity program manager, Joanne 
Saint Louis, to lead its diversity and inclusion efforts.56  CPR developed a 
diversity commitment plan in 2013, which encourages corporations and their 
counsel to pledge their commitment to diversity in the selection of mediators 
and arbitrators.57  In its 2018 annual report,58 AAA reported that the 
proportion of cases in which a woman or minority arbitrator was appointed 
had reached 27 percent.59  The report described the “diversity of the 
arbitrators who decide the cases” as “[v]ery important to the legitimacy of 
the process” and opined that “[w]omen and minorities need to be among the 
arbitrators who actually serve on cases as well as be represented in the pools 
of expert arbitrators an organization can offer the parties.”60 
Regarding demographics for all three providers, some diversity numbers 
were identified in a story in May 2019.61  CPR’s roster of panelists includes 
 
 51. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 43 (characterizing “[t]he American 
Arbitration Association and JAMS . . . [as] the country’s two largest arbitration firms”). 
 52. Simson, supra note 6. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Aebra Coe, ADR Giant Taps Diversity Pro After Jay-Z Beef with Industry, 
LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1208708/adr-giant-taps-
diversity-pro-after-jay-z-beef-with-industry [https://perma.cc/6483-XHPR]. 
 57. See Maria R. Volpe, Measuring Diversity in the ADR Field:  Some Observations and 
Challenges Regarding Transparency, Metrics and Empirical Research, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 201, 201 (2019) (describing this pledge); see also David H. Burt & Laura A. Kaster, Why 
Bringing Diversity to ADR Is a Necessity, ACC DOCKET, Oct. 2013, at 41, 41 (describing this 
pledge). 
 58. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT & FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS (2019), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_ 
2018_Annual_Report_and_Financial_Statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B8U-4PBB]. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Smith, supra note 50. 
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17 percent women and 13 percent individuals who self-identify as ethnically 
or racially diverse, with 31 percent of those panelists selected for arbitration 
being racially diverse; JAMS’s roster is 28 percent women; and AAA’s roster 
is 25 percent women and persons of color.62  The impact that this lack of 
diversity in key service provider pools may have on diverse claimants, 
despite longstanding efforts to improve, has become a major issue.  
Mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims involves 
vulnerable workers of color and other protected classes; thus, a nondiverse 
arbitrator pool raises questions about the integrity of the entire dispute 
resolution process.  Additionally, this problem is not limited to domestic 
arbitration; many commentators have also expressed concerns about 
arbitrator diversity in the international sphere.63  In fact, international 
arbitrator diversity concerns have been much more rigorously reviewed than 
the critiques of domestic arbitration in the United States.64 
In seeking arbitrators, JAMS narrows the supply side of the pool of 
potential arbitrators by preferring a nondiverse group:  those who rise to the 
level of partner at a law firm or former or retired judge.65  This approach is 
understandable on one level because JAMS wants “judges or lawyers who 
have excellent reputations in their [fields].”66  However, if only “2 percent of 
law firm partners are black, 4 percent are Asian, and 2 percent are Hispanic,” 
finding diverse arbitrators that meet these professional criteria poses an 
obstacle.67  As Sarah Cole points out, it is difficult to find diverse candidates 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge:  Exploring the “Invisible 
College” of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 467–94 (2015) 
(describing diversity issues in international arbitration); Douglas Pilawa, Note, Sifting 
Through the Arbitrators for the Woman, the Minority, the Newcomer, 51 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 395, 412–29 (2019) (describing critiques of the lack of arbitral diversity in the international 
arbitration community); Gary L. Benton, Let’s Stop Talking About the Arbitrator Diversity 
Problem, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/ 
2018/01/14/post/ [https://perma.cc/5DXL-PFNP] (discussing diversity issues in international 
arbitration); see also Won Kidane, Does Cultural Diversity Improve or Hinder the Quality of 
Arbitral Justice?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2017), http://arbitrationblog. 
kluwerarbitration.com/2017/03/31/does-cultural-diversity-improve-or-hinder-the-quality-of-
arbitral-justice [https://perma.cc/WY2Z-N6VG] (describing how matching Chinese or 
African witnesses with arbitrators of the same cultural background could help to improve the 
quality of the arbitration process); Catherine A. Rogers, The Key to Unlocking the Arbitrator 
Diversity Paradox?:  Arbitrator Intelligence, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2017), http:// 
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/27/on-arbitrators [https://perma.cc/45CG-
SZ58] (describing concerns about diversity in arbitration). 
 64. Compare Chiara Georgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?:  The Perils and 
Benefits of Empirical Research in International Investment Arbitration, 12 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 263, 269 (2013) (discussing how the trend of international investment arbitrators 
being primarily “‘pale, male, and stale’ . . . can be proven empirically”), with Burt & Kaster, 
supra note 57, at 41–42 (finding that a “dramatic absence of diversity in the neutrals selected 
for [domestic] alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings has flown under the radar” 
and noting that “participation of racial minorities is not statistically available but is known to 
be far lower”). 
 65. Smith, supra note 50. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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who were law firm partners or judges.68  Statistics from the American Bar 
Association (ABA) show that, as of 2019, 36 percent of active attorneys are 
women—a 5.2 percent increase from 2009.69  By far, the most represented 
racial group over that ten-year period has been Caucasian/white, with 85 
percent of active attorneys identifying as such in 2019.70  Hispanic and 
African American attorneys were the second-most represented racial group, 
but each racial group alone only comprised 5 percent of total active 
attorneys.71  Since 2009, African American attorneys saw only a 0.3 percent 
increase in representation.72 
Diversity demographics for lawyers who are partners show even worse 
results.  According to the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), 
“only 18.7 percent of equity partners in law firms are women.”73  NALP data 
also indicates that racial minorities as a whole “account for only 6.1 percent 
of law firm equity partners.”74  The Federal Judicial Center published three 
charts depicting the racial composition of new Article III judges from 1940 
to 2017.75.  One chart demonstrates an insignificant increase in African 
American appointments from 2015 onward and a consistently white 
majority.76  A second chart shows that all thirteen of the new judges 
appointed in 2017 were white.77  The final chart shows that, in 2017, 146 
judges in 2017 identified as African American, while 1070 judges identified 
as white.78 
2.  Implicit Bias Recognition and Training as an Option to Improve 
Arbitration for Diverse Parties 
Given both the lack of judicial diversity and the resemblance between 
arbitration of statutory legal matters and bench trials, efforts to address 
concerns about diversity of judges in bench trials could be helpful in 
addressing similar concerns about diversity of arbitrators.79  Melissa Breger 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See 2019 ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, A.B.A. 1, https:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/national-lawyer-
population-demographics-2009-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR3V-8ZJ5] (last visited Apr. 
12, 2020). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Jenkins, supra note 44. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Demography of Article III Judges, 1789–2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https:// 
www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/race-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/YYJ9-
UMWW] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See generally Melissa L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible:  Exploring Implicit 
Bias, Judicial Diversity, and the Bench Trial, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039 (2019).  For further 
discussion, see Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the 
Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5 (2004) (raising general 
concerns about the lack of racial diversity within the judiciary). 
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recently made the case that implicit bias might have severe consequences in 
bench trials, where the judge is the sole fact finder.80  Even well-intentioned 
judges, when acting as the sole decision maker,81 may contribute to disparate 
treatment of individual minority participants by being unable to appreciate 
the systematic disparate treatment that the minority participant may have 
experienced at various stages of a dispute.82 
Similar to concerns about public confidence and trust in the arbitration 
process, concerns about transparency in the judicial process have become a 
prominent rallying cry in the efforts to improve judicial diversity.83  The 
quest to increase diversity in the judiciary does not suggest that racial identity 
represents a proxy for how a judge may decide a case or that it would warrant 
matching judges with participants based on race.84  However, one’s life 
experiences can shape how one judges.  If the public is to trust the fairness 
of the legal system, courts should seek to provide sufficient diversity in the 
judiciary so that monolithic experiences would be outliers and not the 
norm.85 
A recent article has suggested a method for dealing with the lack of 
diversity and implicit bias with respect to jurors by creating a new process 
for selection.86  This new process would prime jurors to think about their 
implicit biases before trial and give them the opportunity to process the 
information they receive.87  A judge’s instruction or court video could raise 
juror awareness of implicit bias during the voir dire or selection process.88  
The judge would have the opportunity to encourage the jurors to be aware of 
their implicit biases, provide a jury instruction to remind jurors about implicit 
bias concerns during deliberation, and, at the very least, emphasize to the 
jurors the need to be informed about implicit bias during jury selection or 
voir dire.89  Such training may also be helpful for the arbitrators available for 
 
 80. Breger, supra note 79, at 1053. 
 81. One way to address this concern of implicit bias, at least in mediation, is to involve 
multiple mediators, including some mediators of color. See Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and 
Prejudice in Mediation, 70 SMU L. REV. 681, 687 (2017). 
 82. Breger, supra note 79, at 1057. 
 83. Id. at 1073. 
 84. Id. at 1077.  Notably, requirements that jurors be selected from a cross section of the 
community and that no juror be barred from service due to race alone exist to further 
inclusiveness and guarantee due process; they are not based on an assumption that jurors or 
judges base decisions on race. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 79, at 23.  However, 
racism in jury selection can still occur through peremptory challenges, in which a party may 
remove a juror without offering a reason, or by allowing jurors to be removed for cause when 
their views warrant some fear of impartiality. Id. 
 85. Breger, supra note 79, at 1078–79; see also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 
79, at 10 (discussing the value of judicial diversity for understanding the distinct “voice of 
color” that some minorities use to show that they may view the world in a different way). 
 86. See generally Anona Su, A Proposal to Properly Address Implicit Bias in the Jury, 31 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (2020). 
 87. Id. at 98. 
 88. Id. at 98–99. 
 89. Id.  Arbitrators in employment disputes might also be better off if trained on 
understanding implicit bias. See Nicholas Enrique O’Connor, Note, The “Insurmountable 
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selection in employment discrimination cases; neutral service providers 
could mark those arbitrators as having been trained to understand, and be 
thoughtful of, implicit biases. 
3.  Future Steps to Increase the Diversity Pool 
Because of the concerns about having a diverse pool of arbitrators, the 
service providers will have to address the supply-side issue by removing 
some of the group restrictions that they have imposed on their candidate pool.  
For example, parties may need to recognize that successful arbitrators, 
especially those familiar with workplace disputes, need not be former 
partners of law firms or retired judges.  Instead of focusing on a candidate’s 
former status-based position, it might be helpful for neutral service providers 
to put a premium on mastery of the subject matter at hand, especially for 
employment disputes. 
Also, a neutral service provider could prioritize finding an arbitrator who 
has spent a dozen years representing employees or defending employers in 
employment disputes.  If actual field experience in either bringing or 
defending workplace discrimination claims were the focus, diverse 
arbitrators would be easier to obtain.  This focus would also increase the 
likelihood that various human resources and labor relations managers, as well 
as union representatives and civil rights advocates, would be selected for 
labor matters or become part of the pool of diverse arbitrators eligible for 
selection in workplace discrimination disputes.90 
Even nondiverse arbitrators may benefit from training in considering 
implicit biases when deciding claims of workplace discrimination.  Whether 
 
Textual Obstacle”:  A Narrow Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 855, 879 (2019). 
 90. See Jay E. Grenig & Rocco M. Scanza, The Case for the Non-lawyer Employment 
Arbitrator, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2009, at 8, 9 (highlighting how the pool of diverse 
arbitrators would be increased if “minorities from business, government, unions, and 
academia” who are not lawyers were included); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Living the 
Dream of ADR:  Reflections on Four Decades of the Quiet Revolution in Dispute Resolution, 
18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 513, 530 (2017) (describing the need for diversity among 
arbitrators and asserting the value of nonlawyers with expertise in the type of dispute as a 
source for increased diversity).  Unfortunately, many of these individuals cannot serve as 
arbitrators in an employment discrimination dispute unless they are lawyers. See, e.g., 
Qualification Criteria and Responsibilities for Members of the AAA Panel of Employment 
Arbitrators, AM. ARB. ASS’N 1, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/ 
Employment%20Arbitrators%20Qualification%20Criteria.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9QG-
LVHM] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter AAA Employment Arbitrator Qualification 
Criteria] (requiring that panelists be attorneys with at least ten years of experience in 
employment law); see also Employment & Labor:  JAMS Employment Mediation, Arbitration 
and ADR Services, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/employment [https://perma.cc/LB2R-
CXMP] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (describing how the arbitrators are “retired federal, state 
trial, and appellate judges and former litigators”).  The AAA Labor Panel does not require that 
the panelists be attorneys but rather only that they have ten years’ experience in labor relations 
and a “judicial temperament.” Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA Labor Panel, 
AM. ARB. ASS’N 1, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/ 
Labor_QualificationsCriteria_AAAPanel.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYU5-B6AN] (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2020). 
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it involves in-depth training or merely viewing juror instructions developed 
on the subject, some level of acknowledgement of the issue may be a 
worthwhile endeavor for neutral service providers.  This will also help 
neutral service providers as they deal with supply-side issues, either in 
diversifying the pool or helping the nondiverse members of the pool become 
more aware of unconscious and hidden biases. 
II.  DISCONNECTS IN ARBITRATOR DIVERSITY:  PARTY GATEKEEPER 
SELECTIONS 
A.  Risk Aversion:  Winning with the Familiar and Not the Diverse 
Despite repeated mourning and lamentation from various interested 
sectors about the dearth of diverse arbitrators who resolve disputes with 
companies, those seeking to address this complaint have still failed to make 
any significant changes.91  Part of this challenge arises from the difficulty of 
acquiring data to demonstrate the full scope of the problem.92  Maria Volpe 
has catalogued the lack of metrics capturing the diversity of arbitrators.93  
Further, Ben Davis and Deborah Masucci have also identified the need for 
more diversity data from courts and ADR neutral service providers on the 
use of dispute resolution neutrals.94  All of this data retrieval seems aimed at 
the positive end of discovering just how bad the lack of arbitral diversity is 
and priming the pump to find and supply many more diverse individuals to 
be eligible for arbitrator service. 
While the diverse arbitrator supply concern is an issue, it pales in 
comparison to the demand issue regarding diversity in selecting arbitrators.95  
 
 91. See Estlund, supra note 32, at 681, 687 (noting that since “firms have no legal 
obligation to make their chosen procedures publicly available,” this “has made it impossible 
to develop an accurate empirical assessment of the shape of mandatory arbitration as a 
mechanism of dispute resolution and has greatly handicapped efforts to hold firms publicly 
accountable for the fairness of their dispute resolution procedures” and that there is “little 
representative data on any aspect of arbitration”); Volpe, supra note 57.  See generally Samuel 
Estreicher et al., Evaluating Employment Arbitration:  A Call for Better Empirical Research, 
70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 375 (2018) (criticizing the lack of empirical data that would help 
understand more about employment arbitration generally).  A more recent and comprehensive 
study of so-called forced arbitration, compiled from “40,000 arbitrations” filed between 
January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2016, with four service providers in California attempts 
to shine some light on the situation. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 38, at 26–28. 
 92. Volpe, supra note 57, at 202–03 (“[A]ccessing data to gain clarity about the extent of 
diversity has been and remains a daunting undertaking.”). 
 93. Id. at 206. 
 94. Davis & Masucci, supra note 3; see also Deborah Rothman, Gender Diversity in 
Arbitrator Selection, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2012, at 22, 22 (referring to the need to rely 
on anecdotal information about gender diversity because “no reliable data is accessible” on 
women in commercial arbitration). 
 95. See Marvin E. Johnson & Homer C. La Rue, The Gated Community:  Risk Aversion, 
Race, and the Lack of Diversity in Mediation in the Top Ranks, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 
2009, at 17, 18.  As these authors note, “minority neutrals with experience and skills have 
often been ignored by those wanting to enhance the diversity of the field and have been 
overlooked by sophisticated ADR users.” Id. at 17.  However, as long as ADR users’ risk-
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Two prominent labor and employment dispute resolution neutrals, Marvin E. 
Johnson and Homer C. La Rue, noted that, despite diversity efforts aimed at 
providing additional training to enhance opportunities for entry-level neutrals 
of color, sophisticated ADR users were still not selecting skilled minority 
neutrals.96  To enhance the access of experienced neutrals of color to ADR 
clients, Johnson and La Rue formed ACCESS ADR in 2003 with the support 
of JAMS and the ABA’s Section of Dispute Resolution.97  Johnson and La 
Rue viewed the lack of diversity among ADR professionals as a subset of a 
broader concern regarding the need to diversify the legal profession given 
that “30 percent of the general population of the United States is made up of 
persons of color, but only 10 percent of the lawyers fall into that category.”98  
In forming ACCESS ADR, Johnson and La Rue planned on building 
opportunities for experienced mediators of color to meet corporate ADR 
users, which would highlight the overall lack of diversity and foster unique 
engagements between these groups.99 
Despite the noble aims of ACCESS ADR, Johnson and La Rue eventually 
found a severe disconnect between the ADR users and their representatives, 
many of whom were lawyers and referred to as gatekeepers.100  Risk aversion 
prevented these representatives from using highly skilled mediators of color, 
even when these mediators had been identified and relationships had been 
formed through ACCESS ADR.101  While a desire to continue to pursue 
“well-known” mediators resulted in some of the failures to select the 
mediators of color, there was also some evidence that racial and ethnic bias 
played a role in the selection process.102  Johnson and La Rue noted that the 
corporate ADR users resided in a metaphorical gated community to which 
only the representatives had access; those users never encountered the 
mediators of color because the users’ representatives stopped the mediators 
at the gated entrance.103  Representatives refused to employ minority 
mediators despite corporate ADR users’ statements about the need for 
 
averse representatives continue to employ already “well-known” neutrals and engage in 
“racial and ethnic bias,” access to experienced neutrals of color will be stifled. Id. at 20. 
 96. Id. at 17. 
 97. See Homer C. La Rue & Marvin E. Johnson, ACCESS ADR:  A New Diversity 
Initiative Launched with the Support of the JAMS Foundation and the ABA, CORP. COUNS. 
BUS. J. (May 1, 2004), https://ccbjournal.com/articles/access-adr-new-diversity-initiative-
launched-support-jams-foundation-and-aba [https://perma.cc/6CCE-P879]. 
 98. Id.  A more recent report found that “minorities comprise 30% of the civilian 
workforce but [only] 15% of” lawyers and that even fewer are mediators and arbitrators. See 
Deborah Masucci, Moving Forward for the Benefit of our Members:  Minorities in Dispute 
Resolution, JUST RESOLUTIONS E-NEWS (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), May 2015.  
 99. Masucci, supra note 98. 
 100. See Johnson & La Rue, supra note 95; see also David A. Hoffman & Lamont E. 
Stallworth, Leveling the Playing Field for Workplace Neutrals:  A Proposal for Achieving 
Racial and Ethnic Diversity, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2008, at 37, 41 (referring to outside 
attorneys that select arbitrators as “gatekeepers,” noting that they are disproportionately white, 
and emphasizing that they “tend to appoint someone like themselves, someone white, a 
lawyer, and usually male”). 
 101. Johnson & La Rue, supra note 95, at 18. 
 102. Id. at 19–20. 
 103. Id. at 19. 
2272 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
diversity in the mediation pool and their familiarity with many of the 
ACCESS ADR advisory board members who had invited the users to 
participate in the project.104  Given that the ACCESS ADR program involved 
the selection of mediators for “high-stakes and complex cases,”105 Johnson 
and La Rue noted that representatives for the ADR users may have adopted 
a rationale of risk aversion, espoused by one mediator as a justification for 
nonselection:  “when an attorney with a high-value case refers it to mediation, 
he is ‘never going to be criticized for selecting a well-known mediator.’”106 
In looking at the example from ACCESS ADR, the process of having party 
representatives choose the arbitrator poses a key impediment to increasing 
the diversity of arbitrators selected, even if the pool of arbitrators supplied 
provides tremendous diversity.  One might suggest a legal challenge to the 
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate if the selection process will result in 
a nondiverse result.  The few cases where parties have challenged the lack of 
diversity of arbitrators by suing the neutral service providers have proven to 
be unsuccessful, with courts giving very little consideration to the merits 
when issuing a dismissal.107  Also, some parties may not consider improving 
diversity in the pool of arbitrators to be a vital or urgent concern about access 
to justice but rather merely a nice consideration.108  Regardless of the 
diversity of the pool of arbitrators or the actual panel made available, the 
parties make the ultimate selection.109  No party will be happy with having 
chosen a diverse arbitrator if the chosen arbitrator does not rule in favor of 
 
 104. Id. at 18. 
 105. Id. at 19. 
 106. Urška Velikonja, Making Peace and Making Money:  Economic Analysis of the 
Market for Mediators in Private Practice, 72 ALB. L. REV. 257, 275 (2009) (quoting Email 
from John Bickerman, Mediator, to Urška Velikonja (Mar. 23, 2008)). Such risk aversion 
could present a more complex catch-22 for a black attorney or an attorney of color asked to 
represent her corporate clients’ business and diversity interests and also asked to promote the 
diversity interests of her race. See Margaret M. Russell, Beyond “Sellouts” and “Race 
Cards”:  Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 768 
(1997) (describing the “double bind that tokenization imposes on minority attorneys,” defined 
as “the pressure to comport themselves generally as though the legal profession is integrated, 
colorblind, and even raceless, [and] yet to take on the burdens—gratefully!—of role-modeling 
and otherwise representing their race on the occasional race commission or diversity 
committee instituted by their colleagues to manifest concern for the plight of minorities”). 
 107. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial 
Systems?:  Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 47 n.116 (1999) 
(describing how legal challenges to outside processes for choosing arbitrators that focus upon 
“attacking the lack of demographic diversity” have failed); Weatherspoon, supra note 44, at 
801 (noting that the few claims raising legal challenges to the “system of exclusion and 
invisibility” for diverse neutrals have not received a favorable reception from the courts); see 
also Green, supra note 3, at 659 n.108 (citing Smith v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 233 F.3d 
502 (7th Cir. 2000) and Olson v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 876 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Tex. 
1995) as examples of challenges to the diversity of arbitrator pools that have “fallen on deaf 
ears” (quoting Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the Racially Biased Selection of 
Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4 J. AM. ARB. 1, 25 (2005))). 
 108. See Rogers, supra note 63 (discussing how there is a “disconnect” between “arbitral 
institutions” being nudged to increase the diversity of their panels and being successful in 
doing so and the “willingness of parties” to pursue appointment of more diverse arbitrators). 
 109. See Smith, supra note 50 (“[T]he final choice is made by the parties.”). 
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that party.110  Winning is the name of the game in arbitration.  When selecting 
an arbitrator, the parties are concerned with who wins and who loses, not 
with promoting diversity. 
As Johnson and La Rue explained, parties have no incentive to choose a 
diverse arbitrator over a familiar, tried-and-true choice in a high-stakes 
arbitration.111  Because an arbitrator decides how a dispute will be resolved, 
the stakes and risks in choosing an arbitrator can be even higher than in 
choosing, for instance, a mediator, who merely facilitates the dispute’s 
resolution pursuant to the parties’ agreement.112  Deviating from the familiar 
can breed contempt if the result is a loss.  Catherine Rogers has referred to 
the conflict of pursuing both diversity and victory as a “diversity paradox.”113  
The solution to this “paradox,” according to Rogers, is to “close the gap 
between the altruism that animates abstract concerns about diversity, and the 
strategic pragmatism that dominates arbitrator selection in individual 
cases.”114  Unfortunately, to close this gap, parties must decide that the 
diversity objective is just as important in arbitrator selection as prevailing in 
the dispute.   
Because the parties make the final choice about the arbitrator, concerns of 
bias—both overt and unconscious—may also play a role in that selection.  As 
an example, imagine that a black female charges her employer with 
discrimination, and the matter must go to arbitration for final resolution; if 
there is virtually no chance that the pool of potential arbitrators called upon 
will include a black woman, this suggests the deck has been stacked against 
the claimant.115  This is not to say that a white male could not make a fair 
resolution of the black female claimant’s charge in a particular instance.116  
 
 110. See Pilawa, supra note 63, at 417 & n.141 (describing the response of an anonymous 
commentator to a survey on international arbitration as expressing that “the desirability of 
promoting diversity is the last feature on anyone’s mind” (quoting Lucy Greenwood & C. 
Mark Baker, Getting a Better Balance on International Arbitration Tribunals, 28 J. LONDON 
CT. INT’L ARB. 653, 661 n.42 (2012))). 
 111. See generally Johnson & La Rue, supra note 95. 
 112. See Green, supra note 3, at 656 (“[M]ediators should be selected based upon their 
ability to facilitate negotiation of the dispute at issue.”); id. at 666 (describing a typical 
arbitration process of using AAA to provide a list of arbitrators who are “qualified to decide 
employment discrimination cases”). 
 113. See Pilawa, supra note 63, at 418; Rogers, supra note 63. 
 114. Pilawa, supra note 63, at 418 (quoting Rogers, supra note 63). 
 115. See Caley E. Turner, “Old, White, and Male”:  Increasing Gender Diversity in 
Arbitration Panels 12 (Summer 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.cpradr.org/ 
news-publications/articles/2015-03-03--old-white-and-male-increasing-gender-diversity-in-
arbitration-panels/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Old_White_and_Male_Increasing_ 
Gender_Diversity.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4EC-8CWP] (describing concerns about the 
appearance of impropriety where “a young Latino woman [was] forced to arbitrate an 
employment discrimination case against her boss, a white male, in front of a panel of three 
white male arbitrators”). 
 116. See Pilawa, supra note 63, at 429 (“[I]t is not the arbitrator’s culture that matters.  It 
is more the arbitrator’s ability to understand the cultural significance of certain facts.”); see 
also Pittman, supra note 24, at 860, 863–64 (finding that “[w]hen a disproportionate number 
of all arbitrators are conservative, white men, it is only reasonable that minority and female 
plaintiffs will be concerned about the fairness and quality of arbitration awards” and noting 
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However, the claimant may perceive the systematic effort to erect barriers as 
indicative of an unjust dispute resolution process.  Any dispute system 
infected with systematic bias deters the pursuit of justice. 
B.  Gatekeeper Effect:  A Hypothetical 
To illustrate the double bind placed on decision makers when they 
represent clients in arbitration but are also asked to support a diversity 
objective in selecting an arbitrator, this section offers the following 
hypothetical.117  This hypothetical derives from my own experiences and 
observations as an employment discrimination attorney, law professor, 
scholar, and arbitrator.  The hypothetical also relates to stories I have been 
told when teaching or presenting the subject of diversity in the arbitrator 
selection process for employment discrimination cases. 
Sheila Payne, an African American female and electrical engineer, worked 
for HighlyPositioned Company (“the Company”).  Payne believed she had 
been subjected to racial harassment and insults along with comments of a 
sexual nature by her supervisor, Bob Defending.  Defending is a fifty-year-
old white man.  Payne complained pursuant to the Company’s harassment 
policy procedures.  A brief investigation occurred, and the Company 
reprimanded Defending and told him to cease making comments of a sexual 
or racial nature.  Payne continued to work for Defending, who continued to 
subject her to racial and sexual comments.  She then filed an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge.  The Company 
responded with a position statement to the EEOC asserting as its defense that 
Payne failed to utilize its harassment procedures.  Payne filed a claim of 
employment discrimination in court after obtaining a right-to-sue letter.118  
Payne has struggled to find an attorney. 
The Company’s outside counsel filed an appearance and a motion to 
compel arbitration.  Payne had signed some forms several years ago when 
she was first employed that said she “agrees to arbitrate any and all disputes 
with her employer subject to the rules of Highly, Hardy, and Hubris (‘Triple 
H’) Arbitration Services.”  Payne obtained a lawyer, who told her that she 
must select a third-party neutral arbitrator to decide her case.  Payne’s lawyer 
went to the Triple H website and saw that its rules provide for a panel of 
seven names to be given to the parties; each party strikes one name from the 
 
how unconscious bias might result in a nondiverse arbitrator injecting inappropriate racial 
stereotypes into a decision). 
 117. Offering a hypothetical can give a framework, as in this case, to see how 
discrimination might occur within the thesis asserted. See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, Employment 
Discrimination and the Domino Effect, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1060–65 (2017) 
(discussing a hypothetical). 
 118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018) (describing how employees must file timely a 
charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC before receiving a right-to-sue letter, 
which allows the employee to file a lawsuit in court within ninety days); see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.28 (2019). 
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panel until a final selection is made.119  The Company’s outside counsel 
unsuccessfully requested that Triple H provide a panel of arbitrators 
composed only of members of the National Association of Seriously 
Esteemed Arbitrators (NASEA). 
NASEA members must have written at least one hundred arbitration 
awards and must be full-time neutrals not currently practicing law for either 
employers or employees.  NASEA’s membership consists of less than 5 
percent women and less than 2 percent African American members.  Triple 
H responded with a panel of seven individuals who were not all NASEA 
members.  The Company’s outside counsel agreed to meet with Payne and 
her lawyer to strike members from the list and agreed to go first, saying this 
would leave the final strike for Payne. 
The Triple H panel provided some minor biographical information about 
each member of the panel, including self-identified race and gender.120  The 
panel members and the parties’ selection process follows: 
 Janet King, an African American, longtime civil rights activist, a 
former EEOC attorney, the daughter of a famous civil rights leader 
in the 1960s, and an arbitrator for ten years.  Company’s first 
strike. 
 Paul Angst, a well-known, white, male arbitrator who has handled 
hundreds of cases, former president of NASEA, and an arbitrator 
for nearly fifty years.  Payne’s first strike. 
 Darnell Mason, a well-known, African American professor who 
has taught undergraduate labor and industrial relations at State 
University for the last fifteen years while also serving as a part-
time arbitrator.  Company’s second strike. 
 Howard Hefty, another well-known, longtime, white, male 
arbitrator and also a labor and employment law professor at 
Prestigious University Law School for the last thirty years.  
Payne’s second strike. 
 Jane Starmore, a former National Labor Relations Board attorney, 
who has been an arbitrator for the last ten years.  Company’s third 
strike. 
 Harry Heckster, a former human resources manager for a major 
food company, NASEA member, and an arbitrator for twenty-five 
years.  Payne’s third strike. 
 William Worthy, a fifty-year-old white male, the same age and 
race as Defending.  Worthy worked previously in the public sector 
 
 119. This is the typical procedure for selecting an arbitrator. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 15 (2009), https:// 
www.adr.org/sites/default/files/EmploymentRules_Web_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QWB-
32H6] (providing that the parties in a AAA employment dispute may receive a list of 
arbitrators and “strike names objected to” and submit the list “with remaining names in order 
of preference”). 
 120. For the purposes of this hypothetical, we can assume that this self-reported 
information is accurate. 
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for a state agency on labor and employee relations matters before 
becoming a full-time labor and employment arbitrator, a position 
he has held for the last fifteen years. 
Worthy has now become the selected arbitrator.  But let us return to the 
selection process.  Payne struck Angst, Hefty, and Heckster.  Do they have 
anything in common?  They are all men.  We know that Angst and Hefty are 
white.  Angst, Hefty, and Heckster are very experienced and long-time 
arbitrators.  On the other side, the Company struck King, Mason, and 
Starmore.  What do they have in common?  King and Mason are black.  
Starmore and King are women.  King and Starmore have worked for federal 
agencies.  Mason is an undergraduate professor and the only panelist who is 
clearly a part-time arbitrator.  Who are the lawyers in the group?  King, 
Starmore, and Hefty.  From the information Triple H has provided, it is 
uncertain whether others on the panel are current or former lawyers, judges, 
or partners at law firms. 
Assume Payne’s attorney has never had an arbitration with any of the 
panelists.121  The Company’s attorney, on the other hand, has tried arbitration 
cases with King, Angst, Hefty, Heckster, and Worthy as arbitrators. 
Payne probably does not have any legal basis to challenge the selection.122  
Would Payne lack of a legal basis to challenge if these were peremptory 
challenges for jurors in court?123  The arbitrator panel Payne received 
appeared to be somewhat diverse; the seven listed panelists included three 
women and two African Americans.  Moreover, what if the Company’s 
attorney struck King first because, in a prior arbitration, she rejected the 
attorney’s arguments and ruled against his client in a high-stakes 
 
 121. This highlights the difficulty for plaintiffs in employment arbitration when they are 
not repeat players and the employer is a repeat player. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra 
note 38, at 35, 40 (discussing how repeat-player status doubly harms employees, who 
experience worse arbitration results both when their employers are high-level repeat players 
and when the employers are represented by repeat-player attorneys).  Although the 
hypothetical identifies an employment lawyer willing to represent Payne, it suggests the 
attorney is not a repeat player in employment arbitration.  Given how negative employment 
arbitration results tend to be for employees, having an attorney provides some assistance. Id. 
at 57 (noting that “pro se plaintiffs struggle mightily” in “AAA and JAMS employment 
cases”).  However, it is better if the attorney is also a repeat player because employees receive 
added benefits when they have repeat-player plaintiffs’ lawyers. Id. at 58. 
 122. I acknowledged in 2005 that successful legal challenges to the selection of the 
arbitrator based on race were unlikely. See Michael Z. Green, An Essay Challenging the 
Racially Biased Selection of Arbitrators for Employment Discrimination Claims, 4 J. AM. 
ARB. 1, 42 (2005).  However, I suggested that a party might explore using 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
which prohibits discrimination based on race in the making and enforcement of agreements. 
Id. at 45–49. 
 123. Federal courts require jurors to be selected from a fair cross section of the community. 
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2018).  Peremptory challenges of a juror based on race violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98–99 (1986).  
Batson extends to peremptory challenges of a juror based on race in a civil matter. See 
Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 614 (1991).  See generally Sara Rudolph 
Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145 (2004) 
(describing the regulation of discriminatory selection of jurors based on race and arguing for 
similar regulation of nonconsensual discriminatory selection of arbitrators). 
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employment discrimination case?  What if the Company’s attorney struck 
Mason and Starmore because he did not know them?  Would those not be 
legitimate reasons to strike?  And, accordingly, would the Company’s 
attorney not be acting in the best interest of his client?  What if Payne 
perceived the strikes by the Company’s attorney to be based on race and 
gender?  What if the Company’s attorney perceived Payne’s strikes to be 
based on race, gender, and age? 
When Worthy became the selected arbitrator, did race, gender, or age play 
a role?  If Mason had been included on ten separate panels in the last year 
but was never selected—that is, if he repeatedly made it through the supply 
side but was never hired on the demand side—does that affect concerns about 
diversifying arbitral ranks? 
Nothing suggests that Worthy may not be an excellent choice as the 
selected arbitrator for this dispute.  However, assume that, after the 
arbitration hearing occurred and the parties submitted briefs on the matter, 
Worthy found in favor of the Company.  Worthy dismissed Payne’s 
complaint under the rationale that she did not complain after Defending was 
initially reprimanded.124  She failed to put the Company on notice that the 
harassment continued. 
Payne had repeatedly and unsuccessfully argued to Worthy that her initial 
complaint should have been enough.  Notwithstanding her complaint, she 
continued to work directly for Defending and continued to be subjected to 
his racist and sexist behavior.  Payne also argued that, as an African 
American, female engineer, she was in a unique position, as this field 
employs very few women or African Americans.125  She knew if she 
continued to complain, it would support stereotypical notions about women 
and minorities in the field as being technically unsound, always too 
 
 124. Essentially, this raises the question of whether the Company had sufficient facts to 
establish the Supreme Court’s Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense.  See Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 
(1998).  Generally, an employer may avoid liability if it can prove the two elements of the 
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense:  “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 765.  Did Payne act reasonably in not reporting the alleged misdeeds of her 
supervisor a second time after her first report did not result in sufficient corrective action? See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Mgmt. Hosp. of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 437 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a 
reasonable juror would need to decide if the failure to contact a supervisor with an additional 
complaint was reasonable when, after the first complaint, the supervisor failed to adequately 
address the issue and the employee received harsher treatment). 
 125. See Adedamola Agboola, Study:  Black Women Engineers Lack Role Models and 
Experience Increased Bias in the Workplace, BLACK ENTERPRISE (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.blackenterprise.com/study-black-women-engineers-lack-role-models-and-
experience-increased-bias-in-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/3HEZ-L2P7] (describing how 
“[l]ess that 4% of engineering bachelor’s degrees are awarded to African American, Hispanic, 
and Native American women” and how all the African American women studied experienced 
gendered racism leading to isolation and unfair treatment). 
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emotional or angry, and unable to really handle the challenges of the job.126  
Worthy rejected Payne’s arguments and dismissed her discrimination claims. 
This hypothetical highlights why this area is ripe with opportunity for 
black ADR professionals.  Employers must realize that the integrity of their 
mandatory arbitration processes depends upon the availability and use of 
minority arbitrators.  Black workers need the perception and the reality that 
diverse arbitrators have not been excluded on the basis of race or gender.  
After this experience, might Payne believe that the arbitration process—and, 
in particular, the arbitrator selection process—had been stacked against her?  
Could Payne also reasonably believe the Company’s outside counsel 
prevented the selection of any panelist with the background to possibly 
appreciate or understand her arguments a little better?  No matter how diverse 
the arbitrator panels become, that result fails to remove the dilemma faced 
by the parties’ representatives when selecting the arbitrator. 
Attorneys for the Company operate as the gatekeepers.  If risk-averse 
reliance on known arbitrators helps their clients prevail, then the gatekeepers 
may end up keeping out more diverse arbitrators.  If the Company had agreed 
to select Mason to promote diversity by giving a diverse arbitrator an 
opportunity and the Company lost, this would not be a good situation for the 
gatekeeper.  As a result, this Article argues that the neutral service provider 
should simply pick the arbitrator.  If King had been randomly or arbitrarily 
selected by the neutral service provider as the arbitrator for this dispute, the 
Company’s gatekeeper would not be deemed at fault after the fact for that 
selection, regardless of the final result.  Instead, in having prior experience 
with King as an arbitrator, the Company’s attorney could best inform his 
client of the strengths and weaknesses of pursuing certain arguments in an 
arbitration conducted by King.  A neutrally provided selection would 
represent a win-win result in addressing arbitrator diversity, while also 
tackling the selection dilemma posed by risk aversion, as well as any hidden 
or direct biases that may not be remedied in any other way. 
III.  ARBITRARY AND RANDOM ARBITRATOR SELECTION BY SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 
AAA’s mission and vision statement embraces “a shared commitment to 
a diverse Roster of Arbitrators.”127  In line with that commitment, “AAA has 
the ability in its algorithms to provide arbitrator lists to parties that comprise 
at least 20% diverse panelists where party qualifications are met.”128  To 
 
 126. Concerns about an employer’s use of stereotypes can chill certain actions by 
employees of color, which is sometimes referred to as “stereotype threat.” See Green, supra 
note 3, at 651–52 (discussing the stereotype threat construct and how it can explain certain 
behavior of workers who have been subjected to or are concerned about stereotypical 
thinking). 
 127. See Roster Diversity & Inclusion, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://adr.org/RosterDiversity 
[https://perma.cc/8HN5-DGAU] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 128. Id.; see also Jenkins, supra note 44 (providing commentary from the AAA council 
chair who advocated for more diversity in ADR to match society’s diversity and explaining 
that AAA has “recently created and implemented an innovative software tool in our system 
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address the party selection problem, a neutral provider could go one step 
further with the algorithm and select the arbitrator after the initial 20 percent 
diverse panel is created.  This final selection could be determined through a 
random selection after the first step of the algorithm has created the diverse 
panel.  The suggestion that neutral service providers should decide who the 
arbitrator will be is not a new concept; Sarah Cole mentioned the idea in 
2017.129  Cole referred to consumer arbitration rules that allow AAA to 
determine the arbitrator without party selection for claims of $10,000 or 
less.130  Cole acknowledged that the $10,000 threshold was low and that 
AAA did not have similar rules allowing it to select the arbitrator for matters 
above that amount or for any other matters, including employment 
disputes.131  According to Cole, if AAA and other service providers took the 
approach of selecting the arbitrator, then their efforts to increase the diversity 
of their panels would improve the diversity of arbitrators selected to resolve 
the parties’ disputes.132 
Unfortunately, as Cole noted, the parties could opt out of this arbitrator 
appointment rule even if it was extended to employment disputes with a 
much higher monetary threshold.133  However, most parties do not spend 
much time spelling out the details of how they will select an arbitrator in their 
agreements.  Parties tend to rely on the procedures of neutral service 
providers to do the heavy lifting of screening potential arbitrators by agreeing 
that the rules of AAA, JAMS, CPR, or some other neutral service provider 
will apply.134 
To make arbitrator selection by the neutral service provider more of a 
default rule, this Article asserts that it should become an agreed-upon 
standard adopted by the “Employment Due Process Protocol” (the 
“Protocol”).135  The Protocol is a joint agreement developed in 1995 by a 
task force that included key stakeholders and neutral service providers and it 
was aimed at encouraging the use of mediation and arbitration in employment 
disputes, while establishing key procedural safeguards.136  Both AAA and 
JAMS joined the Protocol and have issued important rules aimed at making 
the use of their arbitration procedures fair.137  Both of these neutral service 
providers have also adopted rules to cap fees, provide for comprehensive 
 
which alerts our staff if at least 20 percent of the potential arbitrators on any given list are not 
diverse from racial or gender perspectives”). 
 129. Cole, supra note 22, at 885–86 (noting that AAA is authorized to appoint the arbitrator 
in cases of consumer arbitration claims of $10,000 or less). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 885 n.176 (describing the AAA process). 
 135. See Christopher A. Barreca et al., A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and 
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, NAT’L ACAD. 
ARBITRATORS (May 9, 1995), https://naarb.org/due-process-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4QTG-JVAD]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 38, at 15. 
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discovery, and allow both parties to participate fairly and equally in the 
selection of the arbitrator.138 
The section of the Protocol on panel selection states: 
Upon request of the parties, the designating agency should utilize a list 
procedure such as that of the AAA or select a panel composed of an odd 
number of mediators and arbitrators from its roster or pool.  The panel cards 
for such individuals should be submitted to the parties for their perusal prior 
to alternate striking of the names on the list, resulting in the designation of 
the remaining mediator and/or arbitrator. 
The selection process could empower the designating agency to appoint a 
mediator and/or arbitrator if the striking procedure is unacceptable or 
unsuccessful.  As noted above, subject to the consent of the parties, the 
designating agency should provide the names of the parties and their 
representatives in recent cases decided by the listed arbitrators.139 
This Article suggests a friendly amendment to the above section, which 
would replace the quoted language with the following: 
Upon request of the parties, the designating agency shall appoint a mediator 
and/or arbitrator.  All appointed mediators or arbitrators will come from the 
designated agency’s roster of neutrals with requisite skills and background 
to act as the neutral in the dispute.  The designated agency shall take 
affirmative measures to keep a roster of diverse members on its 
employment mediator and arbitrator panels.  Each appointment of a 
mediator or arbitrator shall be made randomly after ensuring requisite 
concerns about diversity have been factored into the pool from which the 
final selection is made.  Upon selection by the agency of the arbitrator, the 
parties may seek recusal of the arbitrator based upon any conflict of interest 
or bias pursuant to the same standards as provided in the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 
Once the parties choose to use one of the key neutral service providers who 
are parties to this new Protocol, failing to allow the provider to select the 
arbitrator for an employment dispute would constitute a violation of the 
Protocol.  As a result, the parties would not be able to use the key neutral 
service providers to merely provide the parties with a panel.  This new 
provision allows the parties to seek recusal of the arbitrator selected if there 
is bias or a conflict of interest subject to the same standards articulated in the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.140  If recusal is appropriate, the neutral 
service provider would select another arbitrator through the same initial 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Employment Due Process Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N 4, https://www.adr.org/sites/ 
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diversity step and then randomly select an arbitrator in the second step of the 
algorithm. 
This process would also resemble the way federal court judges are 
randomly assigned to cases.  As mentioned earlier, diversity in the judiciary 
has been a concern for some time.141  This is particularly true in state courts, 
where the appointment process has resulted in “class-based exclusivity or 
racial or gender homogeneity.”142  In the federal court system, however, 
judges are assigned randomly to a case.143  Generally, federal court judges 
have been assigned to cases in an effort to provide neutrality and prevent the 
probability of unfairness and the violation of due process.144  Current 
practices regarding actual case and panel assignment in the federal courts 
vary, but generally courts try to eschew outcome-oriented bias by some use 
of random or blind case assignments and panel selections.145  This 
assignment occurs through an electronic system managed by a clerk—“an 
automated case assignment module.”146  To start the process of assigning a 
judge, “the clerk creates electronic ‘decks,’ each of which corresponds to a 
different category of cases, as specified by the court’s case assignment 
procedures.”147  Depending on the judge’s probability of selection and ability 
to handle the kind of case at issue, the clerk allocates “a certain number of 
‘cards’ in each deck.”148  While not completely random, given the application 
of some procedures before the random selection, the final assignment “is 
chosen by a blind draw rather than being assigned by hand.”149  Most 
importantly, the parties to the lawsuit do not have a way of knowing who the 
judge will be in their case until the clerk assigns the judge. 
One might question whether employer groups would want to give up their 
right to select the arbitrator merely to improve the diversity of arbitrators 
selected to handle employment disputes.  Although some may view selection 
of the arbitrator by the neutral service as an infringement on party autonomy, 
as it removes arbitrator selection from the parties’ purview, the reality is that 
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employers and employees rarely choose an arbitrator on their own.  The 
parties rely on neutral service providers such as AAA and JAMS to vet those 
who may be qualified to be selected as the arbitrator.  These matters do not 
involve repeat-player disputes, such as those between a union and an 
employer, where the parties might agree on a permanent arbitrator or umpire 
and bypass the use of a neutral service provider.  As a result, the parties have 
already given up much of their autonomy to neutral service providers.  
Smaller employers, with low-wage employees who are more likely to be 
subject to mandatory arbitration agreements without a broader commitment 
to arbitrator diversity, will appreciate the transaction costs eliminated when 
neutral service providers find and select arbitrators.  These smaller 
businesses cannot risk investing time and money in deciding to become 
outliers by seeking arbitrators not committed to the new Protocol.150  Giving 
the neutral service provider the final call is still a significant step.  But it 
follows from all the steps the parties have already taken in allowing neutral 
service providers to develop pools and find diverse arbitrators. 
Some parties may still believe that party autonomy should be adhered to; 
those parties can choose to find an arbitrator through some other process and 
without service providers who choose to follow the amended Protocol.  
However, the parties who choose another method for arbitrator selection will 
be outliers and subject to public pressure and backlash.151  Social movements 
and bad publicity have started to play a role in driving corporate employer 
behavior, regardless of whether there is a legal obligation.  As an example, 
in 2014, after “a flurry of negative press,” General Mills reversed its policy 
of requiring any consumer who downloaded an online coupon for one of its 
products to agree to mandatory arbitration of future claims and abdicate the 
right to participate in a class action.152 
Within the last two years, as the #MeToo movement has propelled more 
women to come forward to identify objectionable behavior by powerful 
persons in their workforces, employers have responded with more 
transparency, fewer private settlements, and fewer nondisclosure 
agreements.153  The #MeToo movement has also changed other aspects of 
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corporate behavior, pushing companies to no longer seek to enforce 
arbitration agreements.154  Many high-profile companies such as Google and 
Facebook, as well as a number of key law firms,155 have eliminated 
arbitration clauses and other policies that may lead to private resolutions.156  
Negative publicity induced other companies, including Microsoft, Uber, 
Lyft, Airbnb, and eBay, to stop using arbitration for workplace sexual 
misconduct.157  At this stage, businesses agreeing to abandon their arbitration 
polices tend to be large companies and big law firms uniquely concerned 
about negative publicity “due to the image they seek to project and the talent 
they wish to attract.”158  These businesses also tend to be the kinds of entities, 
espousing the value of diversity, that this Article aims to reach.159  If they 
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tend to break from the ranks of the new Protocol, the negative publicity 
should make them rethink that position.160 
As this Article has attempted to highlight, a key difficulty for corporate 
entities committed to addressing arbitrator diversity arises when an 
individual legal representative faces the ultimate decision of arbitrator 
selection.  The legal representative must give the client the best guidance on 
how to prevail in the matter.  At that point, lofty notions about leveraging 
and appreciating diversity take a back seat as risk aversion and possible racial 
bias, either open or unconscious, can lead to a focus on selecting known 
arbitrators.  This Article’s suggestion that the neutral service provider should 
select the arbitrator randomly, just as a federal court would assign a judge, 
takes the pressure off the legal representative.  Ultimately, if the neutral 
service provider selects the arbitrator, the employer’s attorney cannot be 
blamed for making a poor arbitrator selection if the employer loses.  The 
tendency to pick a familiar and reliable arbitrator is thereby removed from 
the selection process. 
Instead, the most important selection criteria will be qualifications 
involving experience in the types of disputes at issue and sufficient expertise 
as an arbitrator.  For example, AAA’s panel of employment arbitrators lists 
the following qualification criteria that panelists must meet or exceed: 
• Attorneys with a minimum of 10 years experience in employment law 
with fifty (50) percent of your practice devoted to this field, retired judges, 
or academics teaching employment law. 
• Educational degree(s) and/or professional license(s) appropriate to your 
field of expertise. 
• Honors, awards and citations indicating leadership in your field. 
• Training or experience in arbitration and/or other forms of dispute 
resolution. 
• Membership in a professional association(s). 
• Other relevant experience or accomplishments (e.g. published articles).161 
As another example, CPR’s specialty employment panel application asks the 
following questions, with certain prefilled answers provided:  (1) “What 
percentage of your law practice or business for the last 10 years has been 
employment-related”?; (2) “Have you had significant employment practice 
in the last 10 years representing or working with the following”? (listing 
“Management,” “Non-executive employees,” “Executives,” and “Other 
(describe)” as prefilled answers); (3) “Have you had significant employment 
practice in the last 10 years devoted to the following dispute processes”? 
(listing “Litigation,” “Dispute Management (in house),” “Arbitration 
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(Neutral or Representative),” “Mediation (Neutral or Representative),” 
“EEOC or other agency,” and “Other (describe)” as prefilled answers); and 
(4) “Please provide a brief description of your employment case experience 
as a neutral.”162   
After these basic qualifications are met, the neutral service provider can 
use algorithms that factor in diversity while randomly and arbitrarily 
selecting the arbitrator to be assigned.  Given that all the stakeholders 
identified seemed to be concerned about diversity, this new selection process 
offers a means to achieve more diverse arbitrator selection.  Neutral service 
providers should step up and make the last call in selecting the arbitrator.  
The neutral provider’s selection of the arbitrator can help provide a 
meaningful response to the long-standing arbitrator diversity concern.163 
CONCLUSION 
Given his public celebrity status, Jay-Z’s inquiry into the lack of black 
arbitrators sparked a national conversation about the lack of diversity among 
arbitrators.164  As one commentator noted, Jay-Z’s “star power” placed “a 
10,000-watt spotlight on a long-standing issue.”165  As a result, those banging 
the drum on behalf of the movement to enhance arbitrator diversity had 
“someone with a huge audience and a lot of money at stake to propel the 
issue into the headlines.”166  Kimberly Taylor, chief legal and operating 
officer of JAMS, agreed:  “Personally, I thought that if anybody had a voice 
to highlight this issue it would be Jay-Z.  It’s something we’ve been talking 
about for a long time . . . and I thought that his particular viewpoint would be 
something that’s helpful to the conversation.”167 
Neutral service providers’ efforts to diversify their rosters, provide 
networking opportunities, and encourage users to consider diversity when 
making selections seem admirable.  However, these diversity efforts “do not 
seem sufficient to overcome the major obstacle facing any prospective 
arbitrator on a roster—being selected.”168  Hence, Jay-Z’s inquiry 
represented a real and valid concern.  In the employment setting, no one 
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would accept a hiring process that would result in repeatedly picking a single, 
racially stratified group:  older white men.  Yet everyone accepts that this is 
a likely consequence of the arbitrator selection process given the current lack 
of diversity when seeking to employ an arbitrator. 
This Article proposes that service providers, all invested in the fairness of 
their efforts to offer arbitrators in a manner that provides justice and does not 
perpetuate systemic discrimination, should be given a greater role in the final 
selection of the arbitrator.  With certain diversity goals in place, these service 
providers can select an arbitrator who is both more than qualified and diverse.  
One of the ongoing flaws in the efforts aimed at increasing arbitrator 
diversity is that current approaches continue to ignore the risk aversion 
exhibited by the representatives selecting the arbitrators.  No representative 
is going to take the risk of selecting an arbitrator to resolve an important 
dispute for a client solely because that arbitrator is diverse.  That 
representative is going to select the arbitrator with whom he or she has the 
most familiarity, rather than risk be second-guessed by the client if the 
arbitrator does not decide in the client’s favor.  Unless the process of 
arbitrator selection is changed, this risk-aversion principle will continue to 
present a stifling concern for those seeking to increase arbitrator diversity, 
regardless of how much the pool of diverse arbitrators is expanded. 
This Article offers a new solution for all those who really want to increase 
diversity among arbitrators and especially for those handling employment 
discrimination disputes.  Parties can require certain arbitrator qualifications 
that focus on experience with employment dispute resolution and are not 
limited to membership in elitist groups (former judges or partners at major 
law firms).  With those qualifications in mind and a new and updated 
Protocol, with the three key service providers and other key constituents such 
as national and local bar associations in agreement, the dispute resolution 
service providers can use an algorithm to maximize diversity and then 
randomly and arbitrarily select the arbitrator. 
The final selection decision will not be placed at the feet of the risk-averse 
representative who is concerned about being second-guessed when losing in 
arbitration.  By taking into account key qualifications and initial diversity 
through a two-step algorithm, service providers can select and appoint 
diverse arbitrators.  This process resembles what happens in federal court 
when parties file a lawsuit and the court provides the parties with an assigned 
judge.  This process of random and arbitrary selection provides a winning 
response to the long-standing concern about arbitrator diversity that Jay-Z 
fortunately shined a light on. 
